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We proposed a scheme of continuous variable quantum key distribution, in which the bright
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen entangled optical beams are utilized. The source of the entangled beams
is placed inside the receiving station, only a half of the entangled beams is transmitted with round
trip and the other half is retained by the receiver. The amplitude and phase signals modulated
on the signal beam by the sender are simultaneously extracted by the authorized receiver with the
scheme of the dense coding correlation measurement for continuous quantum variables, thus the
channel capacity is significantly improved. Two kinds of possible eavesdropping are discussed. The
mutual information and the secret key rates are calculated and compared with that of unidirectional
transmission schemes.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 42.50.-p
I. INTRODUCTION
The quantum key distribution (QKD) based on the fundamental properties of quantum mechanics provides a
way for two distant parties, usually named Alice (sender) and Bob (receiver), to share keys for encryption that
can be absolutely secret in principle. Generally, we say, a communication channel is secure in the sense that any
eavesdropper can be detected by the authorized communication partners. Initially, the discussions and experimentally
demonstrations on QKD were concentrated within the setting of discrete variables (dv). There have been two basic
schemes for qubit-based dv QKD, which are the sending of states from non-orthogonal bases, such as the original
”BB84 protocol” proposed in 1984 by Bennett and Brassard [1], and those based on sharing entanglement between
the sender and receiver, such as Ekert’s scheme (E91) [2]. So far, a plenty of dv QKD schemes have been presented
and its potential application in the long distance secure communication have been experimentally demonstrated
[3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. However, the data transmission rates and the detection efficiency of single photons in dv QKD
schemes are strongly restricted by the today availably technical resources. For pursuing high secret key rates, the
continuous variable (cv) QKD has attracted extensive interest in recent years [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16,
17, 18, 19, 20]. In addition, another motivation to deal with cv QKD is that the mature technology in quantum
optics utilizing continuous quadrature amplitudes of the quantized electromagnetic field, including the preparation,
manipulation and measurement of quantum states, can be used directly in cv quantum communication to provide
efficient implementation. Due to the lack of fast and efficient single-photon detectors available at the moment, the
nearly unit quantum efficiency of bright-light photodetectors at high speeds becomes the most attractive character for
the explorers of cv QKD. On the other hand, the unconditionalness of cv entangled states emerged from the nonlinear
optical interaction in an unconditional fashion is a valuable feature. Earlier, in 1993 J. Kimble’s group in Pasadena
accomplished the first experiment on quantum communication based on cv entanglement, in which the idea about
the quantum secure communication was involved although the security of the protocol was not analyzed carefully
[12]. Later, the cv entangled states has been successfully applied in various quantum communication protocols to
demonstrate the unconditional quantum teleportation, entanglement swapping, quantum dense coding, and so on
[21, 22, 23].
A variety of cv QKD schemes employing the entanglement of the amplitude and phase quadratures of optical
fields were successively proposed. In the scheme proposed by Ralph [10] the entangled EPR fields, which are created
by combining two independent amplitude-squeezed electromagnetic fields, are sent to Bob along with their local
oscillators. A random phase shift is added to one of the fields to prevent an eavesdropper from retrieving the
information by simple interference at a beam-splitter. Reid proposed a similar scheme exploiting the quadrature
entangled fields, in which the protection against eavesdropping is provided by observing a Bell inequality violation
[11]. In Ref. [15], the quantum keys are generated by measuring randomly the amplitude or the phase quadrature of
one of the entangled EPR optical beams. Any disturbance introduced by an eavesdropper will degrade the correlations
and hence possibly be detected. K. Bencheikh et al. proposed a QKD protocol based on cv entanglement, in which the
quantum key generation is achieved by distributing each mode of EPR entangled optical beams to sender and receiver
who perform instantaneous measurements of quadratures [14]. The quantum correlation between the measurement
outcomes are used to constitute the bits of the random secret key. In these protocols, 50% of the bits at least are
2rejected because the base incompatibility and both of EPR entangled beams can be intercepted. Obviously, for a given
noisy channel the optimal individual attack is to take a fraction of the transmitted signal beam, which equals the line
losses at sender’s site and then send the remainder to receiver through own lossless line. In this case, the eavesdropper
is totally undetected, and gets maximum possible information according to the no-cloning theorem. Although in the
above mentioned schemes the two-mode entangling optical fields are utilized, both of the entangling modes can be
intercepted, so the security will not be more enhanced than that using a single mode coherent state of light when the
optimal attack is used, which has been theoretically demonstrated in Ref. [16]. However, if only one of the entangling
modes can be attacked and the other one can be exploited by the authorized receiver merely the entanglement will
be helpful for increasing the mutual information between Alice and Bob and nothing to Eve. Based on this idea we
propose a cv QKD scheme using the quadrature entanglement of two modes in which the security is enhanced and
the transmission efficiency of the secret key is increased due to utilizing quantum dense coding communication.
According to the condition of information theory for secure communication, i.e., for enabling extraction of a secure
key using the error correction techniques and the privacy amplification [24, 25], the mutual information between Alice
and Bob, IAB , must exceed the information that either of them shares with Eve (eavesdropper), IAE and IBE . It has
been proved in Ref. [16] that the condition IAB > IAE (IBE) is always violated for the transmission losses beyond
3 dB (50%) whatever the carriers of the information are the coherent, the squeezed or the entangled states of light.
In the successively completed cv QKD experiments, the 3 dB loss limit was beaten by utilizing classical techniques,
such as the method of the reverse reconciliation [18] or the post-selection procedure [19, 20]. Is it possible to beat
the apparent 3 dB loss limit only using the presently available quantum resources without demanding either the
advanced and the unrealized quantum techniques (quantum memories and entanglement purification et al.) or the
above mentioned classical methods? We note, in all communication schemes discussed by Ref. [16] the information
is transmitted unidirectionally from Alice to Bob. In this case, the noise added in Alice’s side cancels out because
it disturbs equally Eve and Bob. Therefore, the security of these protocols does not rely on the noise feature of the
used light beams. Especially, in the nonmodulated cv QKD scheme using Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) entangled
beams proposed by Silberhorn et al. [15], Alice keeps one of the EPR beams and sends the other to Bob. However,
the photocurrent signals detected by Alice are opened on the classical channel, such that it is logically equivalent to
a randomly modulated squeezed light beam thus brings no any improvement of security [16].
In this paper, we propose a round-trip transmission cv QKD scheme based on EPR entanglement. A source
producing EPR entangled light beams with the quadrature amplitude and phase correlations is placed inside the
station of Bob. Only one of the EPR beams (signal beam) is sent to Alice and the other one (idler beam) is retained
by Bob and never opened even its classical photocurrents. For enhancing transmission capacity we embed the benefits
of cv quantum dense coding [26] in the cv QKD scheme as that done by Degiovanni et al. at the dv protocol [27]. Two
sets of independent random numbers are modulated on the amplitude and phase quadratures of Alice’s EPR beam,
respectively, then she sends the modulated signal beam back to Bob. At Bob, the two sets of signals are simultaneously
decoded under the aid of the retained EPR beam with the homodyne detection [28]. Since each half of the EPR beams
has huge noise individually and the correlation noises between a pair of EPR beams are below the shot noise limit
(SNL), if there is no too much excess noise added in the beams the signal-to-noise ratios (SNR) in Alice’s signal beam
must be lower than that decoded by Bob with the correlation measurements [12, 23]. We found, in this scheme the
condition of IAB > IAE can be satisfied even when the transmission losses exceed 3 dB if higher EPR correlation is
utilized. The security of the proposed system is based on the determinative cv entanglement of EPR light beams and
the quantum no-cloning theorem. Two kinds of eavesdropper attack will be discussed: 1. the individual quantum-tap
attack to the modulated signal beam on the way from Alice to Bob or to both unmodulated and modulated beams
using an optical beam-splitter according to the requiement of optimal cloning. 2. the intercept-resend or partial
intercept-mixing attack to the non-modulated beam on the way from Bob to Alice using the simulated EPR beams
produced by Eve. The calculated results proved that the higher EPR entanglement is helpful to beat the 3 dB loss
limit in the proposed scheme. The regions of the secure raw secret key, (IAB − IAE) > 0, as the functions of the
line transmission and the EPR entanglement correlation factor are calculated. Additionally, like the no-switching
cv QKD scheme presented in Refs. [17] and [20], the usual random switching between measurement bases is not
required and thus the channel capacity can be significantly improved due to the application of quantum dense coding
method. Further, in the dense coding cv QKD scheme we utilize the bright EPR beams with the anticorrelated
amplitude quadratures and the correlated phase quadratures as well as the Bell-state direct detection technique
proposed and used in our previous papers [23, 28], therefore the local oscillation optical beam is not needed in the
Bob’s measurements for extracting the secret keys. Naturally, the protocol dispenses with the technical limitation on
the communication bandwidth placed by the local oscillator switching and is relatively simple to implement. Here
we should mention although the proposed protocol can beat the loss limit of 3 dB in principle, however due to
practical difficulties to produce quadrature entangled light with high entanglement degree and highly susceptibility of
cv entanglement to loss the reachable communication distance has to be strictly limited by the available entanglement
quality. It has been theoretically demonstrated that the entanglement of a cv resource, though being degraded on
3a transmission line with loss never vanishes completely for any degree of the loss, thus once the technologies of cv
entanglement distillation and purification are exploited the drawbacks will be possible to be overcome [29, 30].
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section the cv QKD system is described. The security against the
quantum-tap attack and the intercept-resend attack are discussed in the third and the fourth section, respectively. A
brief conclusion is given in the fifth section.
II. CV QKD SYSTEM USING EPR ENTANGLED OPTICAL BEAMS AND ROUND-TRIP
TRANSMISSION
The schematic of the proposed cv QKD system is shown in Fig. 1. The bright EPR optical beams, aˆ and bˆ, with
the anticorrelated amplitude quadratures and the correlated phase quadratures are produced from an entanglement
source. For experiments, this kind of EPR beams can be obtained with a nondegenerate optical parametric amplifier
(NOPA) below the pump threshold operating in the state of deamplification, which has been well described in Ref.
[23]. The field annihilation operators, aˆ and bˆ, are expressed in terms of the amplitude (Xˆa(b)) and phase (Yˆa(b))
quadrature operators:
aˆ = Xˆa + iYˆa,
bˆ = Xˆb + iYˆb. (1)
The quadrature operators can be written as the sum of a steady state and a fluctuating component
Xˆ =< Xˆ > +δXˆ,
Yˆ =< Yˆ > +δYˆ , (2)
which have variances of V (Xˆ) = 〈(δXˆ)2〉 and V (Yˆ ) = 〈(δYˆ )2〉. For the EPR entangled optical beams produced from
a NOPA operating at deamplification, the variances for each individual beam (aˆ or bˆ) and the correlation variances
are determined by the correlation factor γ (or called squeezing factor), which depends on the strength and the time
of parametric interaction [11, 16],
V (Xˆa) = V (Yˆa) = V (Xˆb) = V (Yˆb) = (γ + 1/γ)/2, (3)
V (Xˆa + Xˆb) = V (Yˆa − Yˆb) = 2γ, (4)
where we have assumed that the two modes, aˆ and bˆ, are totally balanced during the process of measurements and
this requirement is easily achieved in the experiments. The values of γ are taken from 0 to 1, γ = 0 and γ = 1
correspond to the ideally perfect correlation and no any correlation between aˆ and bˆ, respectively. The modes aˆ and
bˆ from NOPA have the orthogonal polarizations and can be separated with a polarizing-beam-splitter (PBS). The
entanglement source is placed inside the station of Bob. The optical mode aˆ, say the signal mode, is sent to Alice
as the quantum channel of the transmitted signals. The mode bˆ, say the idler mode, is retained by Bob and never
is opened. The beam-splitter R1 and R2 with same reflectivity (such as R = 10%) are placed in Bob and Alice who
extract a small part from bˆ and aˆ beam by means of R1 and R2, respectively. The extracted beam from bˆ (aˆ) is
detected by the balanced-homodyne-detector HD1 (HD2) for checking the possible eavesdropper on the way from Bob
to Alice, which will be discussed in Section IV. Like the cv coherent state quantum cryptography protocol presented in
Refs. [18] and [20], for the optimal information rate both amplitude and phase are modulated with Gaussian random
numbers [29]. Alice draws two random real numbers, Xs and Ys, from Gaussian distributions with zero mean and a
variance of V (Xs) and V (Ys). Then she modulates the amplitude and phase quadratures of the transmitted aˆ from
R2 by Xs and Ys with the amplitude (AM) and phase (PM) modulators, respectively. Alice transmits the modulated
signal mode aˆ back to Bob. We assume that the channel transmission efficiencies from Bob to Alice and from Alice
to Bob without the presence of Eve are identical and equal to η. Bob demodulates simultaneously the modulated
amplitude (Xs) and phase (Ys) signals using the Bell-state direct detection under the help of the retained mode bˆ
[28]. The Bell-state direct detection system consists of a 50-50 beam-splitter (BS), a pair of photoelectric detectors
4(D1 and D2), two radio-frequency splitter (RF1 and RF2), a pi/2 phase shifter (PH), a positive and a negative power
combiner (⊕ and ⊖). The beams bˆ1 and aˆ2 interfere on the beam-splitter (BS) and then the output beams cˆ and dˆ
are directly detected by D1 and D2, respectively. νˆ stands for the vacuum noise added in the quantum channel due
to losses. The vacuum noises in different terms are not correlated, thus they have to be considered independently. In
the followings we will calculate the physical conditions for satisfying IAB > IAE .
III. SECURITY CONDITIONS AGAINST OPTIMAL QUANTUM-TAP ATTACK
It has been theoretically demonstrated by Curty et al. [31] that the presence of detectable entanglement in a
quantum state effectively distributed between Alice and Bob is a necessary precondition for successful key distillation.
In the proposed scheme, the quantum entanglement of quadratures shared by Alice and Bob is always existent and
detectable so far as the original EPR entanglement is not exhausted totally by the line losses. The existence of cv
entanglement between Alice and Bob provides the base of security for the proposed protocol. The absolute theoretical
security of cv QKD protocols against any type of attack has already been proven [13, 32, 33, 34]. Here we do not
address the issue of unconditional security and also do not involve the collective attack, which requires the quantum
memory that is not easy to be prepared in today technical condition. We consider security against individual attacks
only. Obviously, at the loss limit the optimal individual attack is that Eve replaces the lossy channel by a perfect
one with an adapted beam splitter to mimic the losses and then generate a cloned signal with a fidelity depending on
the beam splitter transmission. In this case Eve is totally not detected and gets the maximum possible information
according to the no-cloning theorem which is the maximum information amount allowed by the laws of physics. Since
there is no any signal on the quantum channel from Bob to Alice, we first consider a splitting attack on the channel
from Alice to Bob. A splitting attack involving both channels will be considered later in this section.
We will use the Shannon formula of the optimum information rate to calculate the raw secret key rate. The optimum
mutual information (I) of a noisy transmission channel is [35]
I = (1/2)log2(1 + S/N), (5)
S/N is the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). Alice and Bob can establish a secret key if and only if IAB > IAE , thus the
secret key rate is expressed as [16]
∆I = IAB − IAE . (6)
In the case of ∆I > 0 the communication between Alice and Bob will be viewed as being secure. The simpler
quantum-tap attack is to take a fraction (1 − η) of the beam with the modulated signals at Alice’s site, and to send
the fraction η to Bob through her own lossless line. The modulated optical mode at Alice is written as:
aˆ1 =
√
1−R(√ηaˆ+
√
1− ηνˆ) +
√
Rνˆ + s, (7)
and when the mode is transmitted back to Bob the mode aˆ1 becomes aˆ2 if without any interception:
aˆ2 =
√
ηaˆ1 +
√
1− ηνˆ
=
√
1−R[ηaˆ+
√
η(1 − η)νˆ] +
√
Rηνˆ +
√
1− ηνˆ +√ηs, (8)
where R is the reflectivity of the beam-splitter R1 and R2, s stands for the state of the modulated signals. The
signal state is prepared at Alice by displacing the amplitude and phase quadratures of a vacuum state by Xs and Ys
respectively.
In order to measure the amplitude and phase signals by means of the Bell-state direct detection simultaneously,
Bob has to attenuate the retained idler beam bˆ to balance aˆ2. The attenuated bˆ is expressed by bˆ1:
bˆ1 =
√
1−R[ηbˆ+
√
η(1− η)νˆ] +
√
Rηνˆ +
√
1− ηνˆ. (9)
The two output fields from the 50-50 beam-splitter (BS) of the Bell-state direct detection system are [28]
cˆ =
1√
2
(aˆ2 + ibˆ1), (10)
dˆ =
1√
2
(aˆ2 − ibˆ1). (11)
5The variances of the sum and the difference of cˆ and dˆ equal to [28]:
VBX =
1
2
[(1−R)η2V (Xˆa + Xˆb) + 2(1− η2 +Rη2) + ηV (Xs)], (12)
VBY =
1
2
[(1−R)η2V (Yˆa − Yˆb) + 2(1− η2 +Rη2) + ηV (Ys)], (13)
where, V (Xˆa+Xˆb), V (Yˆa− Yˆb) and V (Xs), V (Ys) are the normalized correlation variances of the quadratures between
aˆ and bˆ and the normalized variances of the signal quadratures, respectively. The SNR of Bob’s measurement for the
amplitude and the phase signals are respectively:
(S/N)BX =
ηV (Xs)
(1−R)η2V (Xˆa + Xˆb) + 2(1− η2 +Rη2)
, (14)
(S/N)BY =
ηV (Ys)
(1−R)η2V (Yˆa − Yˆb) + 2(1− η2 +Rη2)
. (15)
For the dense coding QKD scheme, Eve takes a fraction (1−η) of the beam aˆ1 at Alice’s site and then simultaneously
measures the amplitude and phase quadratures of the intercepted beam by means of a 50-50 beam-splitter and two
sets of homodyne detector (HD) as shown in Fig. 2. The variances of the amplitude and phase quadratures measured
by Eve are respectively expressed by:
VEX =
1
2
[η(1 − η)(1−R)V (Xˆa) + 2− (1−R)η + (1−R)η2 + (1− η)V (Xs)], (16)
VEY =
1
2
[η(1− η)(1 −R)V (Yˆa) + 2− (1 −R)η + (1−R)η2 + (1 − η)V (Ys)]. (17)
The SNR of Eve’s measurements equal to
(S/N)EX =
(1− η)V (Xs)
(1−R)η(1 − η)V (Xˆa) + 2− (1−R)η + (1−R)η2
, (18)
(S/N)EY =
(1 − η)V (Ys)
(1−R)η(1 − η)V (Yˆa) + 2− (1−R)η + (1−R)η2
. (19)
Substitute the equations (14) (15) and (18) (19) into the Eq. (5) we can calculate the mutual information IXAB , I
Y
AB
and IXAE , I
Y
AE , as well as the total secret key rate ∆I, which is the sum of the secret key rates of the amplitude (∆I
X)
and phase (∆IY ) quadrature
∆I = IXAB + I
Y
AB − IXAE − IYAE
= IXAB − IXAE + IYAB − IYAE
= ∆IX +∆IY . (20)
Figure 3 shows the secret key rate as a function of the channel efficiency η and the correlation factor γ for the
given signal variances and the reflectivity R, where the normalized V (Xs) = V (Ys) = 10 and R = 0.1. In the case
of γ = 1, i.e. without any EPR correlation between aˆ and bˆ, the scheme is secure (∆I > 0) only at η > 0.5, which
corresponds to the conclusion in Ref. [16] for the unidirect transmission. For comparison, the function of ∆I versus η
in the unidirectional transmission (see Eq. (5) of Ref. [16]) is drawn in Fig. 3 with the dashed line. We can see, when
η > 0.5 our scheme is better than that of the unidirectional transmission even γ = 1 because the dense coding scheme
is applied. However, for the lower η (η < 0.5), the unidirectional transmission is advantaged since the transmission
losses are doubled in the round-trip transmission protocol. For γ = 0.05 and γ = 0.4 (corresponding to the correlation
degree of 13 dB and 4 dB, respectively), ∆I will be larger than zero once η > 0.33 and η > 0.46, respectively. It
means, the limitation of 3 dB losses (η > 0.5) can be beaten in our scheme using EPR entanglement if Eve only taps
the modulated channel. It is obvious from the equations of SNR, for the channel with very high losses (η → 0) the
6SNR will only depend on the variances of the modulated signal, V (Xs) or V (Ys), thus all figures cross to the same
point on ∆I axis [∆I = −2.58 in the case of V (Xs) = V (Ys) = 10].
Figure 4 shows the dependences of the secret key rate on the correlation factor γ for η = 0.7, 0.5 and 0.25 respectively.
The three dashed lines correspond to the function curves of the unidirectional transmission with η = 0.7, 0.5 and 0.25
also for comparison. When η > 0.5, the secret key rates of the proposed scheme are always larger than that of the
unidirectional transmission. For η = 0.25, the unidirectional transmission is not secure always while our scheme can
be secure if the EPR correlation is high enough (γ < 0.02).
An other better clone attack scheme is that Eve taps both the unmodulated optical beam before Alice and the
modulated signal beam after Alice, then to substract the two intercepted signal beams for performing the correlation
measurement. In this case the two extracted beams are the thermal optical fields and very noisy due to the added
vacuum noise on the beam-splitter. According to the requirement of the above-mentioned optimally individual attack,
the extracted amount should match the line loss. Eve has to simultaneously measure the amplitude and phase
quadratures of both the intercepted unmodulated optical beam and the modulated signal beam by means of four sets
of homodyne detection systems. The measured amplitude and phase quadratures of the intercepted light beams on
the ways before and after Alice are respectively:
Xˆ
′
E1
=
1√
2
(
√
1− ηXˆa −√ηXˆν + Xˆν), (21)
Yˆ
′
E1
=
1√
2
(
√
1− ηYˆa −√ηYˆν − Yˆν); (22)
and
Xˆ
′
E2
=
1√
2
[
√
η(1− η)(1 −R)Xˆa + (1− η)
√
1−RXˆν +
√
R(1− η)Xˆν −√ηXˆν + Xˆν +
√
1− ηXs], (23)
Yˆ
′
E2
=
1√
2
[
√
η(1 − η)(1 −R)Yˆa + (1 − η)
√
1−RYˆν +
√
R(1− η)Yˆν −√ηYˆν − Yˆν +
√
1− ηYs]. (24)
For eliminating the thermal-like component of the noises [V (Xˆa) and V (Yˆa)], Eve multiplies the tapped unmodulated
signal beam [Eqs. (21) and (22)] by
√
η(1 −R), that is to attenuate the optical beam by a factor of
√
η(1 −R), then
subtracts the tapped modulated signal beam [Eqs. (23) and (24)] from it. The variances of [
√
η(1 −R)Xˆ ′E1 − Xˆ
′
E2
]
and [
√
η(1−R)Yˆ ′E1 − Yˆ
′
E2
] equal to
V
′
EX =
1
2
{[η
√
1−R− (1− η)
√
1−R]2 + 1 + η(1 −R) + η +R(1− η) + (1− η)V (Xs)}, (25)
V
′
EY =
1
2
{[η
√
1−R− (1 − η)
√
1−R]2 + 1 + η(1−R) + η +R(1− η) + (1 − η)V (Ys)}. (26)
The corresponding signal to noise ratios are
(S/N)
′
EX =
(1− η)V (Xs)
[η
√
1−R− (1− η)√1−R]2 + 1 + η(1 −R) + η +R(1− η) , (27)
(S/N)
′
EY =
(1 − η)V (Ys)
[η
√
1−R− (1− η)√1−R]2 + 1 + η(1 −R) + η +R(1− η) . (28)
Figure 5 shows the function curves of the secret key rate ∆I versus the channel efficiency η for the dual-tap attack,
where the normalized V (Xs) = V (Ys) = 10 and R = 0.1. For γ = 1, the secret key rate is larger than zero only when
η > 0.5, which is same to the case of only tapping the modulated signal. For γ = 0.05 and γ = 0.4, the secret key
rate is positive when η > 0.46 and η > 0.474, respectively. We see, under this attack due to that the influence of the
thermal-like component of noises involved in the two intercepted optical beams is canceled, the effect of increasing
EPR correlation to the secret key rate will not be as strong as that only attacking modulated signal beam (Fig. 3
and 4). However, we still see the possibility to beat the apparent 3 dB loss limit of the raw secret key rate.
7IV. SECURITY AGAINST INTERCEPT-RESEND ATTACK
An other possible attack on the way from Bob to Alice is that Eve intercepts totally the signal beam without the
modulated signals and retains it in her station, then she sends a simulated beam, which can be a half of simulated
EPR entangled beams, to Alice. If Alice does not know that the beam is simulated, she will modulate the signals
on it and send it out as usual. Eve intercepts the modulated signal beam again and demodulates the signals using
the other half of the simulated EPR beams retained by herself as that done by Bob. At last she modulates the same
signals on the real signal beam and sends it back to Bob. Fortunately, in our scheme Bob retains a half of the real
EPR beams and never opens it. Any simulated beam can not be quantum-correlated with the real one. Bob and
Alice take a part of the beam bˆ and aˆ from R1 and R2 respectively, then randomly measure the amplitude or phase
quadrature of the taken partial beam with the homodyne detector (HD1 and HD2) during the communication. Alice
sends her measurement results to Bob by a classical channel and Bob checks the quantum correlation between his
quadratures and Alice’s quadratures measured simultaneously. The correlation variances of the amplitude (VRX) and
the phase (VRY ) between the reflected beams from R1 and R2 are:
VRX =
1
2
RηV (Xˆa + Xˆb) + 1−Rη, (29)
VRY =
1
2
RηV (Yˆa − Yˆb) + 1−Rη. (30)
Statistically, they simultaneously measure the same quadrature with 50% probability and the correlation variances of
the two measured values will be below the shot noise limit (SNL) due to the existence of EPR correlations between
aˆ and bˆ if there is no the intercept -resend attack. When the simulated beam is used, the quantum correlation
disappear thus the variances always are higher than the SNL. The quantum noncloning forbids Eve to copy the
quantum fluctuation of the real signal beam and provides the physical mechanism of security for our scheme. In cv
experiments the correlation variances of quadratures up to 0.1 dB below the SNL can be precisely measured by means
of homodyne detectors under today technical condition. As a loose limitation we take 0.3 dB, which was detected in
the early experiment of quantum optics in 1985 [36], to be a bound for detecting Eve with a high probability over
99%. For given original EPR entanglement and the line transmission, the requirement VRX = VRY =0.928 (according
to 0.32 dB below the SNL) is reached when
R =
2(VRX − 1)
η[V (Xˆa + Xˆb)− 2]
(31)
For example, if γ = 0.2 [corresponding to V (Xˆa + Xˆb) = V (Yˆa − Yˆb) =0.4, which is 7 dB below the SNL, which is
experimentally reachable at present [37].], η =0.9 and VRX = VRY =0.928, we have R = 0.1. In the calculations
of equations (7)-(20) the effect of R has been involved. The procedure checking the intercept-resend attack can be
performed instantaneously during the communication proceeding and the communication will not be disturbed only
the original quantum correlation is decreased, for example if R = 0.1 the correlation is decreased from 7 dB to 5.5
dB.
If Eve partially mixes her own EPR beam with the transferred real one instead of totally replacing it, according
to the optimally cloning scheme the replaced partial amplitude should equal
√
1− ηXˆe(Yˆe) [Xˆe(Yˆe) is the amplitude
(phase) of a half of EPR beams prepared by Eve and
∣∣∣Xˆe∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣Xˆa∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣Yˆe∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣Yˆa∣∣∣]. The amplitude and phase
quadratures of the optical field received by Alice are
Xˆ
′′
A =
√
ηXˆa +
√
1− ηXˆe, (32)
Yˆ
′′
A =
√
ηYˆa +
√
1− ηYˆe, (33)
and the remainders retained by Eve are
Xˆ
′′
E =
√
1− ηXˆa −√ηXˆe, (34)
8Yˆ
′′
E =
√
1− ηYˆa −√ηYˆe. (35)
Then Eve intercepts all modulated beam and performs the correlation measurement using the other half (Xˆf , Yˆf )of
the entangled beams prepared by Eve. In this case, V (Xˆe+ Xˆf )[V (Yˆe− Yˆf )] should be smaller than SNL and depends
on the correlation degree (γE) of Eve’s EPR beams. The correlation variances measured by Eve equal to
V
′′
EX =
1
2
[(1 −R)(1− η)V (Xˆe + Xˆf ) + (1−R)ηV (Xˆa) + (1− R)η + 2R+ V (Xs)], (36)
V
′′
EY =
1
2
[(1−R)(1− η)V (Yˆe − Yˆf ) + (1−R)ηV (Yˆa) + (1−R)η + 2R+ V (Ys)]. (37)
The corresponding SNRs are
(S/N)
′′
EX =
V (Xs)
(1−R)(1 − η)V (Xˆe + Xˆf ) + (1−R)ηV (Xˆa) + (1−R)η + 2R
, (38)
(S/N)
′′
EY =
V (Ys)
(1−R)(1 − η)V (Yˆe − Yˆf ) + (1−R)ηV (Yˆa) + (1 −R)η + 2R
. (39)
The correlation degree between Bob’s beam reflected from R1 and Alice’s beam from R2 must be decreased since
the partial non-correlated light [Xˆe(Yˆe)] is mixed in the measured beams. The calculated variances are
V
′′
RX =
1
2
[RηV (Xˆa + Xˆb) +R(1− η)V (Xˆe) + 2−R−Rη], (40)
V
′′
RY =
1
2
[RηV (Yˆa − Yˆb) +R(1− η)V (Yˆe) + 2−R−Rη]. (41)
The higher the EPR correlation between Xˆe(Yˆe) and Xˆf (Yˆf ) is, the larger the V (Xˆe)[V (Yˆe)] is, thus V
′′
RX(V
′′
RY )
increases. For example, taking γE =0.05 (corresponding to 13 dB below the SNL), when γ =0.2 (7 dB below the
SNL), V (Xs) = V (Ys) =10, R =0.1 and η =0.9, if the light intensity mixed by Eve is 10% of the total intensity, the
correlation degree between Alice’s and Bob’s reflected beams will be reduced from 0.32 dB (without eavesdropper) to
0.11 dB, thus the presence of Eve will be revealed.
On the other hand, Eve has to add partial uncorrelation light into the beam retained by her to make Bob receiving
equal intensity of light, otherwise she must be revealed immediately. The amplitude and phase quadratures of the
light beam sent back to Bob are
Xˆ
′′
a = η
√
1−RXˆa − η
√
1−R√
1− η
√
ηXˆe +
√
1− η
2(1 −R)
1− η Xˆν +
√
ηXs, (42)
Yˆ
′′
a = η
√
1−RYˆa − η
√
1−R√
1− η
√
ηYˆe +
√
1− η
2(1−R)
1− η Yˆν +
√
ηYs. (43)
The correlation variances and the SNRs measured by Bob equal to
V
′′
BX =
1
2
[(1 −R)η2V (Xˆa + Xˆb) + η
3(1−R)
1− η V (Xˆe) + 2− (1 −R)η
2 − η
2(1−R)
1− η + ηV (Xs)], (44)
9V
′′
BY =
1
2
[(1−R)η2V (Yˆa − Yˆb) + η
3(1−R)
1− η V (Yˆe) + 2− (1−R)η
2 − η
2(1−R)
1− η + ηV (Ys)], (45)
and
(S/N)
′′
BX =
ηV (Xs)
(1−R)η2V (Xˆa + Xˆb) + η3(1−R)1−η V (Xˆe) + 2− (1 −R)η2 − η
2(1−R)
1−η
, (46)
(S/N)
′′
BY =
ηV (Ys)
(1−R)η2V (Yˆa − Yˆb) + η3(1−R)1−η V (Yˆe) + 2− (1−R)η2 − η
2(1−R)
1−η
. (47)
If Eve replaces 10% of total beam intensity the SNRs calculated with Eq. (46) and (47) are (S/N)
′′
BX =
(S/N)
′′
BY =0.15 ( γE =0.05, γ =0.2, V (Xs) = V (Ys) =10, R =0.1 and η =0.9) and the SNRs calculated with
Eq. (14) and (15), which only consider the optimal cloning attack of one channel, are (S/N)BX = (S/N)BY =10.8
with same parameters. The significant reduction of the SNRs will clearly reveal the presence of Eve also.
Although Eve might obtained more information by means of the correlation measurement using the EPR beams
prepared by herself, her presence will be also revealed. Of course, if Eve has perfect entangled beams and perfect
quantum memory the eavesdropping scheme might be better than that totally intercepting. For more detailed dis-
cussion we have to compare the information amounts respectively obtained by Bob and Eve in this case and find the
region for the secure transmission, which have been over the range of this paper.
V. CONCLUSION
We proposed a round-trip transmission cv QKD scheme based on the EPR entanglement of optical beams. We
mixed the advantage of cv dense coding into QKD, thus the secret key rate is significantly improved. Due to Bob’s
simultaneously measuring both amplitude and phase quadratures the randomly switching between measurement bases
is not required, such that the serious technical limitation on the communication bandwidth placed by the local oscillator
switching and the technical difficulty of precisely controlling the phase of a local oscillator are not existent any more.
At last, we should mention, although the EPR optical beams with the anticorrelated amplitude and correlated
phase quadratures are discussed in the paper, the scheme and all calculations are appropriate also to the EPR optical
beams with the correlated amplitude and anticorrelated phase quadratures (V (Xˆa− Xˆb) < SNL, V (Yˆa+ Yˆb) < SNL),
which can be produced from an optical parametric amplifier operating at amplification [12, 21]. In this case, Bob
only needs to substitute the Bell-state direct detection with two sets of the normal balanced homodyne detector as
described in the original cv dense coding paper [26].
Several possible attack schemes have been discussed, however the unconditional security for the proposed protocol
has not been demonstrated. Although Eve’s eavesdropping technologies are various, the discussed attack schemes
are representative and usually used. Especially, the discussions about beam-splitter attack are based on the optimal
individual attack allowed by the no-cloning theorem of quantum mechanics, thus have common significance. The
theoretical demonstration of unconditional security for the proposed scheme is beyond the scope of the paper and
might be remained to be an open question.
Due to the sensitivity of the optical quantum entanglement to losses the application of the proposed scheme in
the long-distance communication is limited. However the proposed scheme have shown the possiblility to beat the
loss limit of 3 dB using the cv EPR entanglement. Along with the development of quantum optical technology the
higher and higher determinative cv entanglement can be reached, so the potential of the proposed scheme in future
application is expected.
This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grants No. 60238010 and
60378014).
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Captions of figures:
Fig. 1 The schematic of the quantum key distribution with bright EPR beams.
AM-amplitude modulator, PM-phase modulator, R-reflection rate of the beam-splitter R1 and R2, PBS-polarization
beamsplitter, HD-homodyne detection system, η-channel efficiency, PH-pi/2 phase shifter, RF-radio-frequency splitter.
Fig. 2 Eve’s detection system. HD-homodyne detection system, η-channel efficiency.
Fig. 3 The secret key rate versus channel efficiency at various correlation degrees for the case only tapping modulated
beam. V (Xs) = V (Ys) = 10, R = 0.1, solid lines-the function curves of the presented scheme, dashed line-the function
curves of the unidirectional transmission scheme.
Fig. 4 The secret key rate versus correlation degree at various channel efficiencies for the case only tapping
modulated beam. V (Xs) = V (Ys) = 10, R = 0.1, solid lines-the function curves of the presented scheme, dashed
lines-the function curves of the unidirectional transmission scheme.
Fig. 5 The secret key rate versus channel efficiency at various correlation degrees for the case tapping both
modulated and unmodulated beams. V (Xs) = V (Ys) = 10, R = 0.1
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
 
Fig. 1 
Bob Bell-state direct detection system 
Entanglement 
Source 
Alice 
η η 
R2 
HD1 
HD2 
R1 
PBS 
νˆ
aˆ
bˆ
νˆ νˆ
νˆ
AM PM 
1aˆ
2
aˆ
cˆ
dˆ
PH 
RF1  
D1 
D2 
RF2  
BS 
1bˆ
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.2 
HD 
HD 
Alice Bob 
Eve 
1ˆa 2aˆ
νˆ
νˆ
η
50-50 
                              Fig. 3 
                             Fig. 4 
                                 Fig. 5 
